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Abstract. We introduce natural strategic games on graphs, which capture the
idea of coordination in a local setting. We study the existence of equilibria that
are resilient to coalitional deviations of unbounded and bounded size (i.e., strong
equilibria and k-equilibria respectively). We show that pure Nash equilibria and
2-equilibria exist, and give an example in which no 3-equilibrium exists. More-
over, we prove that strong equilibria exist for various special cases.
We also study the price of anarchy (PoA) and price of stability (PoS) for these
solution concepts. We show that the PoS for strong equilibria is 1 in almost all
of the special cases for which we have proven strong equilibria to exist. The PoA
for pure Nash equilbria turns out to be unbounded, even when we fix the graph
on which the coordination game is to be played. For the PoA for k-equilibria, we
show that the price of anarchy is between 2(n−1)/(k−1)−1 and 2(n−1)/(k−1).
The latter upper bound is tight for k = n (i.e., strong equilibria).
Finally, we consider the problems of computing strong equilibria and of deter-
mining whether a joint strategy is a k-equilibrium or strong equilibrium. We prove
that, given a coordination game, a joint strategy s, and a number k as input, it is
co-NP complete to determine whether s is a k-equilibrium. On the positive side,
we give polynomial time algorithms to compute strong equilibria for various spe-
cial cases.
1 Introduction
In game theory, coordination games are used to model situations in which play-
ers are rewarded for agreeing on a common strategy, e.g., by deciding on a com-
mon technological or societal standard. In this paper we introduce and study a
very simple class of coordination games, which we call coordination games on
graphs:
We are given a finite (undirected) graph, of which the nodes correspond
to the players of the game. Each player chooses a color from a set of
colors available to her. The payoff of a player is the number of neighbors
who choose the same color.
⋆ An extended abstract of this paper appeared in [3]. Part of this research has been carried out
while the second author was a post-doctoral researcher at Sapienza University of Rome, Italy.
Our main motivation for studying these games is that they constitute a natural
class of strategic games that capture the following three key characteristics:
1. Join the crowd property [34]: the payoff of each player weakly increases
when more players choose her strategy.
2. Asymmetric strategy sets: players may have different strategy sets.
3. Local dependency: the payoff of each player depends only on the choices
made by certain groups of players (i.e., neighbors in the given graph).
The above characteristics are inherent to many applications. As a concrete ex-
ample, consider a situation in which several clients have to choose between mul-
tiple competing providers offering the same service (or product), such as peer-
to-peer networks, social networks, photo sharing platforms, and mobile phone
providers. Here the benefit of a client for subscribing to a specific provider in-
creases with the number of clients who opt for this provider. Also, each client
typically cares only about the subscriptions of certain other clients (e.g., friends,
relatives, etc.).
In coordination games on graphs it is beneficial for each player to align
her choices with the ones of her neighbors. As a consequence, the players may
attempt to increase their payoffs by coordinating their choices in groups (also
called coalitions). In our studies we therefore focus on equilibrium concepts that
are resilient to deviations of groups; more specifically we study strong equilibria
[6] and k-equilibria (also known as k-strong equilibria) of coordination games
on graphs. Recall that in a strong equilibrium no coalition of players can prof-
itably deviate in the sense that every player of the coalition strictly improves her
payoff. Similarly, in a k-equilibrium with k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, where n is the number
of players, no coalition of players of size at most k can profitably deviate.
Our contributions. The focus of this paper is on the existence, inefficiency and
computability of strong equilibria and k-equilibria of coordination games on
graphs. Our main contributions are as follows:
1. Existence. We show that Nash equilibria and 2-equilibria always exist. On the
other hand, k-equilibria for k ≥ 3 do not need to exist. We therefore derive a
complete characterization of the values of k for which k-equilibria exist in our
games.
We also show that strong equilibria exist if only two colors are available.
Further, we identify several graph structural properties that guarantee the exis-
tence of strong equilibria: in particular they exist if the underlying graph is a
pseudoforest4 , and when every pair of cycles in the graph is edge-disjoint. Also,
4 Recall that in a pseudoforest each connected component has at most one cycle.
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they exist if the graph is color complete, i.e., if for each available color x the
components of the subgraph induced by the nodes having color x are complete.
Moreover, existence of strong equilibria is guaranteed in case the coordination
game is played on a color forest, i.e., for every color, the subgraph induced by
the players who can choose that color is a forest.
We also address the following question. Given a coordination game denote
its transition value as the value of k for which a k-equilibrium exists but a (k+1)-
equilibrium does not. The question then is to determine for which values of k a
game with transition value k exists. We exhibit a game with transition value 4.
In all our proofs the existence of strong equilibria is established by showing
a stronger result, namely that the game has the coalitional finite improvement
property, i.e., every sequence of profitable joint deviations is finite (see Section 2
for a formal definition).
2. Inefficiency. We also study the inefficiency of equilibria. In our context, the so-
cial welfare of a joint strategy is defined as the sum of the payoffs of all players.
The k-price of anarchy [1] (resp. k-price of stability) refers to the ratio between
the social welfare of an optimal outcome and the minimum (resp. maximum)
social welfare of a k-equilibrium5 .
We show that the price of anarchy is unbounded, independently of the un-
derlying graph structure, and the strong price of anarchy is 2. In general, for the
k-price of anarchy with k ∈ {2, . . . , n − 1} we derive almost matching lower and
upper bounds of 2n−1k−1 − 1 and 2
n−1
k−1 , respectively (given a coordination game
that has a k-equilibrium). We also prove that the strong price of stability is 1 for
the cases that there are only two colors, or the graph is a pseudoforest or color
forest.
Our results thus show that as the coalition size k increases, the worst-case
inefficiency of k-equilibria decreases from ∞ to 2. In particular, we obtain a
constant k-price of anarchy for k = Ω(n).
3. Complexity. We also address several computational complexity issues. Given
a coordination game, a joint strategy s, and a number k as input, it is co-NP
complete to determine whether s is a k-equilibrium. However, we show that this
problem can be solved in polynomial time in case the graph is a color forest. We
also give polynomial time algorithms to compute strong equilibria for the cases
of color forests, color complete graphs, and pseudoforests.
Related work. Our coordination games on graphs are related to various well-
studied types of games. We outline some connections below.
5 The k-price of anarchy is also commonly known as the k-strong price of anarchy.
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First, coordination games on graphs are polymatrix games. Recall that a
polymatrix game (see [24,26]) is a finite strategic game in which the payoff for
each player is the sum of the payoffs obtained from the individual games the
player plays with each other player separately. Cai and Daskalakis [13] con-
sidered a special class of polymatrix games which they call coordination-only
polymatrix games. These games are identical to coordination games on graphs
with edge weights. They showed that pure Nash equilibria exist and that finding
one is PLS-complete. The proof of the latter result crucially exploits that the
edge weights can be negative. Note that negative edge weights can be used to
enforce that players anti-coordinate. Our coordination games do not exhibit this
characteristic and are therefore different from theirs.
Second, our coordination games are related to additively separable hedonic
games (ASHG) [10,12], which were originally proposed in a cooperative game
theory setting. Here the players are the nodes of an edge weighted graph and
form coalitions. The payoff of a node is defined as the total weight of all edges to
neighbors that are in the same coalition. If the edge weights are symmetric, the
corresponding ASHG is said to be symmetric. Recently, a lot of work focused
on computational issues of these games (see, e.g., [8,9,18]). Aziz and Brandt
[7] studied the existence of strong equilibria in these games. The PLS-hardness
result established in [18] does not carry over to our coordination games because
it makes use of negative edge weights, which we do not allow in our model.
Note also that in ASHGs every player can choose to enter every coalition which
is not necessarily the case in our coordination games. Such restrictions can be
imposed by the use of negative edge weights (see also [18]) and our coordination
games therefore constitute a special case of symmetric ASHGs with arbitrary
edge weights.
Third, our coordination games on graphs are related to congestion games
[32]. In particular, they are isomorphic to a special case of congestion games
with weakly decreasing cost functions (assuming that each player wants to min-
imize her cost). Rozenfeld and Tennenholtz [33] derived a structural charac-
terization of strategy sets that ensure the existence of strong equilibria in such
games. By applying their characterization to our (transformed) games one ob-
tains that strong equilibria exist if the underlying graph of the coordination game
is a matching or complete (both results also follow trivially from our studies).
Bilo` et al. [11] studied congestion games where the players are embedded in
a (possibly directed) influence graph (describing how the players delay each
other). They analyzed the existence and inefficiency of pure Nash equilibria in
these games. However, because the delay functions are assumed to be linearly
increasing in the number of players, these games do not cover the games we
study here.
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Further, coordination games on graphs are special cases of the social net-
work games introduced and analyzed in [4] (if one uses in them thresholds equal
to 0). These are games associated with a threshold model of a social network in-
troduced in [2] which is based on weighted graphs with thresholds.
Coordination games are also related to the problem of clustering, where the
task is to partition the nodes of a graph in a meaningful manner. If we view the
strategies as possible cluster names, then a Nash equilibrium of our coordina-
tion game on a graph corresponds to a “satisfactory” clustering of the underly-
ing graph. Hoefer [22] studied clustering games that are also polymatrix games
based on graphs. Each player plays one of two possible base games depend-
ing on whether the opponent is a neighbor in the given graph or not. Another
more recent approach to clustering through game theory is by Feldman, Lewin-
Eytan and Naor [17]. In this paper both a fixed clustering of points lying in a
metric space and a correlation clustering (in which the distance is in [0,1] and
each point has a weight denoting its ‘influence’) is viewed as a strategic hedonic
game. However, in both references each player has the same set of strategies, so
the resulting games are not comparable with ours.
Strategic games that involve coloring of the vertices of a graph have also
been studied in the context of the vertex coloring problem. These games are
motivated by the question of finding the chromatic number of a graph. As in our
games, the players are nodes in a graph that choose colors. However, the payoff
function differs from the one we consider here: it is 0 if a neighbor chooses the
same color and it is the number of nodes that chose the same color otherwise.
Panagopoulou and Spirakis [30] showed that an efficient local search algorithm
can be used to compute a good vertex coloring. Escoffier, Gourve`s and Mon-
not [15] extended this work by analyzing socially optimal outcomes and strong
equilibria. Chatzigiannakis et al. [14] studied the vertex coloring problem in a
distributed setting and showed that under certain restrictions a good coloring
can be reached in polynomial time.
Strong and k-equilibria in strategic games on graphs were also studied in
Gourve`s and Monnot [19,20]. These games are related to, respectively, the
MAX-CUT and MAX-k-CUT problems. However, they do not satisfy the join the
crowd property, so, again, the results are not comparable with ours.
To summarize, in spite of these close connections, our coordination games
on graphs are different from all classes of games mentioned above. Notably, this
is due to the fact that our games combine the three properties mentioned above,
i.e., join the crowd, asymmetric strategy sets and local dependencies modeled
by means of an undirected graph.
Research reported here was recently followed in two different directions.
In [5] and [35] coordination games on directed graphs were considered, while
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in [31] coordination games on weighted undirected graphs were analyzed. Both
setups lead to substantially different results that are discussed in the final section.
Finally, [16] studied the strong price of anarchy for a general class of strategic
games that, in particular, include as special cases our games and the MAX-CUT
games mentioned above.
As a final remark, let us mention that the coordination games on graphs are
examples of games on networks, a vast research area surveyed in [25].
Our techniques. Most of our existence results are derived through the applica-
tion of one technical key lemma. This lemma relates the change in social welfare
caused by a profitable deviation of a coalition to the size of a minimum feed-
back edge set of the subgraph induced by the coalition6. This lemma holds for
arbitrary graphs and provides a tight bound on the maximum decrease in so-
cial welfare caused by profitable deviations. Using it, we prove our existence
results by means of a generalized ordinal potential function argument. In partic-
ular, this enables us to show that every sequence of profitable joint deviations
is finite. Further, we use the generalized ordinal potential function to prove that
the strong price of anarchy is 1 and that strong equilibria can be computed effi-
ciently for certain graph classes.
The non-existence proof of 3-equilibria is based on an instance whose graph
essentially corresponds to the skeleton of an octahedron and whose strategy sets
are set up in such a way that at most one facet of the octahedron can be uni-
colored. We then use the symmetry of this instance to prove our non-existence
result.
The upper bound on the k-price of anarchy is derived through a combinato-
rial argument. We first fix an arbitrary coalition of size k and relate the social
welfare of a k-equilibrium to the social welfare of an optimum within this coali-
tion. We then extrapolate this bound by summing over all coalitions of size at
most k. We believe that this approach might also prove useful to analyze the
k-price of anarchy in other contexts.
2 Preliminaries
A strategic game G := (N, (S i)i∈N , (pi)i∈N) consists of a set N := {1, . . . , n}
of n > 1 players, a non-empty set S i of strategies, and a payoff function pi :
S 1 × · · · × S n → R for each player i ∈ N. We denote S 1 × · · · × S n by S , call
each element s ∈ S a joint strategy, and abbreviate the sequence (s j) j,i to s−i.
Occasionally we write (si, s−i) instead of s.
6 Recall that a feedback edge set is a set of edges whose removal makes the graph acyclic.
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We call a non-empty subset K := {k1, . . . , km} of N a coalition. Given a
joint strategy s we abbreviate the sequence (sk1 , . . . , skm ) of strategies to sK and
S k1 × · · · × S km to S K . We also write (sK, s−K) instead of s. If there is a strategy
x such that si = x for all players i ∈ K, we also write (xK , s−K) for s.
Given two joint strategies s′ and s and a coalition K, we say that s′ is a
deviation of the players in K from s if K = {i ∈ N | si , s′i}. We denote this by
s
K
→s′. If in addition pi(s′) > pi(s) holds for all i ∈ K, we say that the deviation s′
from s is profitable. Further, we say that the players in K can profitably deviate
from s if there exists a profitable deviation of these players from s.
Next, we call a joint strategy s a k-equilibrium, where k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, if no
coalition of at most k players can profitably deviate from s. Using this defini-
tion, a Nash equilibrium is a 1-equilibrium and a strong equilibrium [6] is an
n-equilibrium.
Given a joint strategy s, we call the sum SW(s) = ∑i∈N pi(s) the social
welfare of s. When the social welfare of s is maximal, we call s a social opti-
mum. Given a finite game that has a k-equilibrium, its k-price of anarchy (resp.
stability) is the ratio SW(s)/SW(s′), where s is a social optimum and s′ is a k-
equilibrium with the lowest (resp. highest) social welfare7. The (strong) price of
anarchy refers to the k-price of anarchy with k = 1 (k = n). The (strong) price
of stability is defined analogously.
A coalitional improvement path, in short a c-improvement path, is a max-
imal sequence (s1, s2, . . . ) of joint strategies such that for every k > 1 there
is a coalition K such that sk is a profitable deviation of the players in K from
sk−1. Clearly, if a c-improvement path is finite, its last element is a strong equi-
librium. We say that G has the finite c-improvement property (c-FIP) if every
c-improvement path is finite. So if G has the c-FIP, then it has a strong equi-
librium. Further, we say that the function P : S → A (where A is any set) is a
generalized ordinal c-potential for G if there exists a strict partial ordering ≻ on
the set A such that if s K→s′ is a profitable deviation, then P(s′) ≻ P(s). A gen-
eralized ordinal potential is also called a generalized strong potential [21,23]. It
is easy to see that if a finite game admits a generalized ordinal c-potential then
the game has the c-FIP. The converse also holds: a finite game that has the c-FIP
admits a generalized ordinal c-potential. The latter fact is folklore; we give a
self-contained proof in Appendix A.
Note that in the definition of a profitable deviation of a coalition, we insisted
that all members of the coalition change their strategies. This requirement is
irrelevant for the definitions of the k-equilibrium and the c-FIP, but it makes
some arguments slightly simpler.
7 In the case of division by zero, we define the outcome as ∞.
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1
{a, c}
2
{a, b}
3
{a, b}
4
{b, c}
5
{b, c}
6
{c, a}
7
{c, a}
8
{b, a}
Fig. 1. A graph with a color set assignment. The bold edges indicate pairs of players choosing the
same color.
3 Coordination games on graphs
We now introduce the games we are interested in. Throughout the paper, we
fix a finite set of colors M of size m, an undirected graph G = (V, E) without
self-loops, and a color assignment A. The latter is a function that assigns to each
node i a non-empty set Ai ⊆ M. A node j ∈ V is a neighbor of the node i ∈ V if
{i, j} ∈ E. Let Ni denote the set of all neighbors of node i. We define a strategic
game G(G, A) as follows:
– the players are identified with the nodes, i.e., N = V ,
– the set of strategies of player i is Ai,
– the payoff function of player i is pi(s) := |{ j ∈ Ni | si = s j}|.
So each node simultaneously chooses a color from the set available to her and
the payoff to the node is the number of neighbors who chose the same color. We
call these games coordination games on graphs, from now on just coordination
games.
Example 1. Consider the graph and the color assignment depicted in Figure 1.
Take the joint strategy that consists of the underlined strategies. Then the payoffs
are as follows:
– 1 for the nodes 1, 6, 7,
– 2 for the nodes 2, 3,
– 3 for the nodes 4, 5, 8.
It is easy to see that the above joint strategy is a Nash equilibrium. However,
it is not a strong equilibrium because the coalition K = {1, 4, 5, 6, 7} can prof-
itably deviate by choosing color c. ⊓⊔
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We now recall some notation and introduce some terminology. Let G =
(V, E) be a graph. Given a set of nodes K, we denote by G[K] the subgraph of
G induced by K and by E[K] the set of edges in E that have both endpoints
in K. So G[K] = (K, E[K]). Further, δ(K) denotes the set of edges that have
one node in K and the other node outside of K. Also, given a subgraph C of G
we use V(C) and E(C) to refer to the set of nodes and the set of edges of C,
respectively.
Furthermore, we define SWK(s) := ∑i∈K pi(s). Given a joint strategy s we
denote by E+s the set of edges {i, j} ∈ E such that si = s j. We call these edges
unicolored in s. (In Figure 1, these are the bold edges.) Note that SW(s) = 2|E+s |.
Finally, we call a subgraph unicolored in s if all its nodes have the same color
in s.
4 Existence of strong equilibria
We begin by studying the existence of strong equilibria and k-equilibria of co-
ordination games. We first prove our key lemma and then show how it can be
applied to derive several existence results.
4.1 Key lemma
Recall that an edge set F ⊆ E is a feedback edge set of the graph G = (V, E) if
the graph (V, E \ F) is acyclic.
Lemma 1 (Key lemma). Suppose s K→s′ is a profitable deviation. Let F be a
feedback edge set of G[K]. Denote SW(s′) − SW(s) by ∆SW and for a coalition
L denote SWL(s) − SWL(s) by ∆SWL. Then
∆SW = 2(∆SWK − |E+s′ ∩ E[K]| + |E+s ∩ E[K]|) (1)
and
∆SW > 2(|F ∩ E+s | − |F ∩ E+s′ |). (2)
Proof. Let NK denote the set of neighbors of nodes in K that are not in K.
Abbreviate SW(s′) − SW(s) to ∆SW, and analogously, for a coalition L, let
∆SWL = SWL(s′) − SWL(s). The change in the social welfare can be written
as
∆SW = ∆SWK + ∆SWNK + ∆SWV\(K∪NK ).
We have
SWK(s) = 2|E+s ∩ E[K]| + |E+s ∩ δ(K)|
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and analogously for s′. Thus
∆SWK = 2(|E+s′ ∩ E[K]| − |E+s ∩ E[K]|) + |E+s′ ∩ δ(K)| − |E+s ∩ δ(K)|.
It follows that
∆SWNK = |E+s′ ∩ δ(K)| − |E+s ∩ δ(K)|
= ∆SWK − 2(|E+s′ ∩ E[K]| − |E+s ∩ E[K]|).
Furthermore, the payoff of the players that are neither in K nor in NK does not
change and hence ∆SWV\(K∪NK ) = 0. Putting these equalities together, we obtain
(1).
Let Fc = E[K] \ F. Then
|E+s ∩ E[K]| − |E+s′ ∩ E[K]| = |E+s ∩ F| − |E+s′ ∩ F| + |E+s ∩ Fc| − |E+s′ ∩ Fc|.
We know that (K, Fc) is a forest because F is a feedback edge set. So |Fc| < |K|.
Hence
|E+s ∩ F
c| − |E+s′ ∩ F
c| ≥ −|Fc| > −|K|.
Furthermore, each player in K improves his payoff when switching to s′ and
hence ∆SWK ≥ |K|. So, plugging in these inequalities in (1) we get
∆SW > 2(|K| + |E+s ∩ F| − |E+s′ ∩ F| − |K|) = 2(|E+s ∩ F| − |E+s′ ∩ F|),
which proves (2). ⊓⊔
Let τ(K) be the size of a minimal feedback edge set of G[K], i.e.,
τ(K) = min{|F| |G[K] \ F is acyclic}. (3)
Equation (2) then yields that SW(s′)− SW(s) > −2τ(K). The following example
shows that this bound is tight.
Example 2. We define a graph G = (V, E) and a color assignment as follows.
Consider a clique on l nodes and let K be the set of nodes. Every i ∈ K can
choose between two colors {ci, x}, where ci , c j for every j , i. Further, every
node i ∈ K is adjacent to (l − 2) additional nodes of degree one, each of which
has the color set {ci}. Note that when defining a joint strategy s, it is sufficient to
specify si for every i ∈ K because the remaining nodes have only one color to
choose from.
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Let s := (ci)i∈K and s′ := (x)i∈K . Then s K→s′ is a profitable deviation because
every node in K increases its payoff from (l − 2) to (l − 1). Also |E+s | = l(l − 2)
and |E+s′ | =
l(l−1)
2 , so
|E+s | − |E
+
s′ | = l
(
l − 2 − l − 1
2
)
= l
(
l − 1
2
− 1
)
.
Furthermore, each tree on |K| nodes has |K| − 1 edges. Thus
τ(K) = |E[K]| − (|K| − 1) = l(l − 1)
2
− (l − 1) = l
(
l − 1
2
− 1
)
+ 1.
So SW(s′) − SW(s) = 2(|E+s′ | − |E+s |) = −2τ(K) + 2. Tightness follows because
the left hand side is always even. ⊓⊔
4.2 Color forests and pseudoforests
We use our key lemma to show that coordination games on pseudoforests admit
strong equilibria. Recall that a pseudoforest is a graph in which every connected
component contains at most one cycle. For a color x ∈ M let
Vx = {i ∈ V | x ∈ Ai}
be the set of nodes that can choose x. If G[Vx] is a forest for all x ∈ M, we call
G a color forest (with respect to A). Note that, in particular, a forest constitutes
a color forest. Given a joint strategy s, we call a subgraph G′ of G completely
non-unicolored in s if none of its edges is unicolored in s.
We first derive some corollaries from our key lemma. Throughout this sec-
tion, we consider a profitable deviation s K→s′ and let ∆SW = SW(s′) − SW(s).
Corollary 1. If ∆SW ≤ 0, then there is a cycle C in G[K] that is completely
non-unicolored in s and unicolored in s′.
Proof. Assume that the claim does not hold. Then for all cycles C in G[K],
we can pick an edge eC ∈ E[C] that is unicolored in s or non-unicolored in
s′. Let F = {eC | C is a cycle in G[K]}. This is a feedback edge set satisfying
F ∩ E+s′ ⊆ F ∩ E
+
s . Hence by (2), ∆SW > 2(|E+s ∩ F| − |E+s′ ∩ F|) ≥ 0, which is a
contradiction. ⊓⊔
The next statement follows immediately from Corollary 1 because unicolored
cycles cannot exist in color forests. Note that forests are a special case.
Theorem 1. Suppose that G[K] is a color forest. Then ∆SW > 0. Hence every
coordination game on a color forest has the c-FIP. ⊓⊔
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Corollary 2. If G[K] is a graph with at most one cycle, then ∆SW ≥ 0.
Proof. If G[K] is a connected graph with exactly one cycle, then there is a feed-
back edge set of size 1. Hence ∆SW > −2. Because the left hand side is even,
this implies ∆SW ≥ 0. ⊓⊔
Using Corollary 1 and 2, we now establish the following result.
Theorem 2. Every coordination game on a pseudoforest has the c-FIP.
Proof. Associate with each joint strategy s the pair
P(s) := (SW(s), |{C | C is a unicolored cycle in s}|) .
We now claim that P : S → R2 is a generalized ordinal c-potential when we
take for the strict partial ordering ≻ on P(S ) the lexicographic ordering.
Consider a profitable deviation s K→s′. By partitioning K into the subsets
of different connected components we can decompose this deviation into a
sequence of profitable deviations such that each deviating coalition induces
a subgraph of a connected graph with at most one cycle. By Corollary 2
the social welfare in each of these profitable deviations weakly increases. So
SW(s′) ≥ SW(s).
If SW(s′) > SW(s) then P(s′) ≻ P(s). If SW(s′) = SW(s), then by Corollary
1 each of these profitable deviations is by a coalition that induces a connected
graph with exactly one cycle. Moreover, this cycle becomes unicolored in s′.
Thus P(s′) ≻ P(s). ⊓⊔
4.3 Further applications
The following corollary is an immediate consequence of Corollary 1.
Corollary 3. In every coordination game, every sequence of profitable devi-
ations of coalitions of size at most two is finite. Hence Nash equilibria and
2-equilibria always exist.
Corollary 4. Every coordination game in which at most two colors are used
has the c-FIP.
Proof. Let s K→s′ be a profitable deviation. By assumption, all players in K then
deviate to their other option. As a consequence, every edge in E[K] is uni-
colored in s′ if and only if it is unicolored in s. Hence each cycle in G[K]
that is unicolored in s′ is also unicolored in s. It follows from Corollary 1 that
SW(s′) > SW(s). This shows that SW is a generalized ordinal c-potential. ⊓⊔
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The existence of strong equilibria for coordination games with two colors
and symmetric strategy sets follows from Proposition 2.2 in [28]. Corollary 3
shows that a stronger result holds, namely that these games have the c-FIP. This
implies that arbitrary coalitional improvement paths always converge to a strong
equilibrium.
We next derive an existence result of k-equilibria in graphs in which every
pair of cycles is edge-disjoint. We call an edge e of a graph private if it belongs
to a cycle and is node-disjoint from all other cycles.
Lemma 2. Let G be a graph in which every pair of cycles is edge-disjoint. Then
there exists a private edge.
Proof. Given a cycle C, we call a node v ∈ V(C) an anchor point of C if v can
be reached from a node v′ ∈ V(C′) of another cycle C′ , C without traversing
an edge in E(C). First we show that there always exists a cycle with at most one
anchor point. Assume that the claim does not hold. Then every cycle C of G
contains at least two distinct anchor points. Fix an arbitrary cycle C of G and let
v1C and v
2
C be two anchor points of C. Start from v
1
C and traverse the edges of C
to reach v2C . Then follow a shortest path P that connects v
2
C to a node v
1
C′ ∈ V(C′)
of another cycle C′ , C; P must exist because v2C is an anchor point.
Note that C and C′ share at most one node because all cycles are edge-
disjoint; in particular, P might have length zero and consist of a single node
only. Because we choose a shortest path connecting C and C′, v1C′ must be an
anchor point of C′. By assumption, C′ has another anchor point v2C′ . Repeat
the above procedure with cycle C′ and anchor points v1C′ and v
2
C′ . Continuing
this way, we construct a path that traverses cycles of G. Eventually, this path
must return to a previously visited cycle. So this path contains a cycle and this
cycle shares at least one edge with one of the visited cycles. This contradicts the
assumption that all cycles of G are pairwise edge-disjoint.
Now, let C be a cycle with at most one anchor point v (if no such node
exists, any edge in E(C) is private). Then any edge e ∈ E(C) such that v is not
an endpoint of e is private. ⊓⊔
Theorem 3. Consider a coordination game on a graph G in which every pair
of cycles is edge-disjoint. Let k be the minimum length of a cycle in G. Then
every sequence of profitable deviations of coalitions of size at most k is finite. In
particular, the game has a 3-equilibrium.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the number z of cycles. If z = 1, then the
claim follows by Theorem 2.
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Now, let z > 1. Let s K→s′ be a profitable deviation such that |K| ≤ k. From
(1) we infer that
∆SW = 2(∆SWK − |E+s′ ∩ E[K]| + |E+s ∩ E[K]|) ≥ 2(∆SWK − |E[K]|)
because |E+s′ ∩ E[K]| ≤ |E[K]|. Because k is the minimum length of a cycle in G
and |K| ≤ k, we have |E[K]| ≤ |K|. So ∆SW ≥ 0.
Consider a sequence of profitable deviations s1
K1
→s2
K2
→s3 . . . We show that it
is finite. Because the social welfare cannot decrease and is upper bounded there
is an index l ≥ 1 such that for all i ≥ l, SW(si) = SW(sl). We can assume without
loss of generality that l = 1. By Corollary 1, for each i ≥ 1 there is a cycle Ci in
G[Ki] such Ci is completely non-unicolored in si and unicolored in si+1. Note
that k ≤ |V(Ci)| ≤ |Ki| ≤ k and hence Ki = V(Ci).
By Lemma 2, there is a cycle C with a private edge e = {u1, u2} ∈ E(C). We
claim that C = Ci for at most one i. Assume otherwise and let i1, i2 such that
C = Ci1 = Ci2 and C , Ci for i1 < i < i2. Because C = Ci1 , e is unicolored in
si1+1. We know that C is the only cycle containing u j for j = 1, 2 by choice of
e. So u j < Ki for i1 < i < i2 and hence e is still unicolored in i2. But C switches
from completely non-unicolored in si2 to unicolored in si2+1, a contradiction.
Since C is the only cycle containing u j for j = 1, 2, it follows that each u j
can appear at most once in a deviating coalition. So there is an index l such that
u1, u2 < Ki for all i > l. Hence if we remove e and call the new graph G′, then for
all i > l, si
Ki
→si+1 is a profitable deviation in G′. Because G′ has one cycle less
than G, we can apply the induction hypothesis and conclude that the considered
sequence of profitable deviations is finite. ⊓⊔
4.4 Uniform coordination games
Next, we establish the c-FIP property for some additional classes of coordina-
tion games. We call a coordination game on a graph G uniform if for every joint
strategy s and for every edge {i, j} ∈ E it holds that if si = s j then pi(s) = p j(s).
Theorem 4. Every uniform coordination game has the c-FIP.
Proof. Given a sequence θ ∈ Rn of reals we denote by θ∗ its reordering from the
largest to the smallest element. Associate with each joint strategy s the sequence
(p1(s), . . . , pn(s))∗ that we abbreviate to p∗(s). We now claim that p∗ : S → Rn
is a generalized ordinal c-potential when we take for the partial ordering ≻ on
p∗(S ) the lexicographic ordering on the sequences of reals.
Suppose that some coalition K profitably deviates from the joint strategy s
to s′ = (s′K , s−K). We claim that then p∗(s′) ≻ p∗(s).
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Assume this does not hold. Rename the players such that p∗(s′) =
(p1(s′), . . . , pn(s′)). Let i be the smallest value for which pi(s′) < pi(s). By as-
sumption such an i exists. By the choice of i for all j < i we have p j(s′) ≥ p j(s)
and also p j(s′) ≥ pi(s′).
Now, pi(s′) < pi(s) implies that i < K and hence we can write s′ = (si, s′−i).
By the definition of the payoff functions, it follows that there exists some neigh-
bor j of i with s j = si and s′j , s j. Thus, j ∈ K. By the uniformity property,
pi(s) = p j(s). So p j(s′) > p j(s) = pi(s). Consequently, by the choice of i, we
have p∗(s′) ≻ p∗(s), which is a contradiction. ⊓⊔
We can capture by Theorem 4 the following class of coordination games:
We say that G is color complete (with respect to A) if for every x ∈ M each
component of G[Vx] is complete. (Recall that Vx = {i ∈ V | x ∈ Ai}.)
Corollary 5. Every coordination game on a color complete graph has the c-
FIP. In particular, every coordination game on a complete graph has the c-FIP.
The existence of strong equilibria for color complete graphs also follows
from a result by Rozenfeld and Tennenholtz [33] and the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Coordination games on color complete graphs are a special case of
monotone increasing congestion games in which all strategies are singletons.
Proof. We can assume without loss of generality that for each color x, G[Vx] is
connected (otherwise, we replace x with a new respective color for each compo-
nent of G[Vx]). Then we can identify x with a singleton resource, along with the
payoff function vx : N → R such that vx(k) = k − 1. Now, if a player i chooses
si = x then
pi(s) = |{ j ∈ Ni | s j = x}| = |{ j ∈ V | s j = x}| − 1 = vx(|{ j ∈ V | s j = x}|),
so the payoff in the coordination game coincides with the payoff in the associ-
ated congestion game. ⊓⊔
Rozenfeld and Tennenholtz [33] show that monotone increasing congestion
games in which all strategies are singletons admit strong equilibria. Note, how-
ever, that our result above is stronger because we show that these games have
the c-FIP.
4.5 Non-existence of 3-equilibria and existence thresholds
We next prove that 3-equilibria do not exist in general. Recall that 2-equilibria
always exist by Corollary 3.
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6, {3, 4}
5, {2, 3}4, {1, 2}3, {1, 4}
1, {1, 3}
2, {2, 4}
7, {1} 9, {3}
10, {4}
8, {2}
Fig. 2. Three-dimensional illustration of the coordination game used to show that 3-equilibria
do not exist (Theorem 5). The colored facets indicate the triangles that can be unicolored. The
identity of the players is displayed in boldface. The strategy sets of the players are stated between
curly braces.
Theorem 5. There exists a coordination game that does not have a 3-
equilibrium.
Proof. We define a coordination game G(G, A) as indicated in Figure 2: There
are n = 10 players and 4 colors. The strategy sets are as follows: A1 = {1, 3},
A2 = {2, 4}, A3 = {1, 4}, A4 = {1, 2}, A5 = {2, 3}, A6 = {3, 4}, A7 = {1}, A8 = {2},
A9 = {3}, A10 = {4}. There are 16 edges, defined as follows: Players 1 and 2 are
both connected to players 3,4,5, and 6, accounting for 8 of the edges. There is
aditionally a cycle (3, 4, 5, 6, 3), accounting for four more edges. Lastly, players
7, 8, 9, and 10 all have a single edge attached to them and are connected to
players 3, 4, 5, and 6, respectively.
As can be seen from Figure 2, the graph on which the game is played is
essentially the skeleton of an octahedron: 12 of the edges and 6 of the nodes of
the graph belong to this skeleton, and the four remaining edges are connected to
four remaining nodes that are dummy players (i.e., they have only one strategy
that they can play).
Observe that there are eight triangles in the graph, which correspond to the
eight facets of the octahedron. The strategy sets are defined such that only four
out of the eight triangles of the octahedron can be unicolored. Also, this game is
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constructed such that if one triangle is unicolored, then the other three triangles
are necessarily not unicolored.
We prove the theorem by showing that for every strategy profile of G, there
exists a profitable deviation of a set of at most 3 players. To simplify the proof,
we make use of the many symmetries in G, which are apparent from Figure 2.
Let s be an arbitrary strategy profile of G. We distinguish two cases:
– If there is a triangle that is unicolored under s, we may assume without loss
of generality that this triangle is the one corresponding to players {1, 3, 4}
(because of symmetry), i.e., s1 = s3 = s4 = 1. Observe that p4(s) = 2. We
distinguish two cases:
• p5(s) = 2. Then s5 = s6 = 3. If s2 = 4 then player 6 can deviate
profitably to 4. If s2 = 2 then the coalition {2, 6} can deviate profitably
to 4.
• p5(s) ≤ 1. If s2 = 2 and s5 = 2, then player 4 can deviate profitably to
2. If s2 = 2 and s5 = 3 then the coalition {4, 5} can deviate profitably to
2. If s2 = 4, then s5 = 3, and coalition {2, 4, 5} can deviate profitably to
2.
– If there is no triangle that is unicolored under s, we distinguish again two
cases. By symmetry we may assume that s1 = 1.
• s3 = 4. Then p3(s) ≤ 1, so player 3 can profitably deviate by changing
his color to 1.
• s3 = 1. Then s4 = 2. If p4(s) = 1 then player 4 can profitably deviate by
changing his color to 1. Otherwise, p4(s) = 2 and either (s2, s5) = (2, 3)
or (s2, s5) = (4, 2).
∗ If (s2, s5) = (2, 3), then if also p5(s) = 2 it holds that s6 = 3 and
therefore player 1 can profitably deviate to 3. If p5(s) = 1, then
player 5 can profitably deviate to 2.
∗ If (s2, s5) = (4, 2), then p2(s) ≤ 1, so player 2 can profitably deviate
to 2.
Note that each profitable deviation given above consists of at most three
players. This concludes the proof. ⊓⊔
The coordination game given in Figure 2 is an example of a game that does
not have a 3-equilibrium but admits a 2-equilibrium. We define the transition
value of a coordination game as the value of k for which a k-equilibrium ex-
ists but a (k + 1)-equilibrium does not. Clearly, the instance in Figure 2 has an
transition value of k = 2. An interesting question is whether one can identify
instances of coordination games with a non-trivial transition value k ≥ 3.
We next show that the coordination game given in Figure 1 is an instance
with transition value k = 4.
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Theorem 6. There is a coordination game that has a transition value of 4.
Proof. Consider the coordination game discussed in Example 1 (see Figure 1).
We first argue that it does not admit a 5-equilibrium. Assume for the sake of a
contradiction that s is a strong equilibrium of this game.
Consider players 4 and 5. Let i, j ∈ {4, 5}, i , j be such that pi(s) ≤ p j(s).
Note that the neighbors of i and j (excluding j and i, respectively) are the same.
As a consequence, if si , s j, then player i can profitably deviate to player j’s
color, i.e., s′i = s j. Thus players 4 and 5 have the same color in s, say s4 =
s5 = b. (Because of the symmetry of the instance, the case s4 = s5 = c follows
analogously.)
Assume there exists a player i ∈ {2, 3} with si , b. Then i can profitably
deviate by choosing s′i = b. It follows that players 2 and 3 have color s2 = s3 =
b.
Next, consider player 8 and suppose s8 = b. Then his payoff is p8(s) =
2. Further, the payoff of each of the players 1, 6 and 7 is 0 because all their
neighbors have color b. But then the coalition K = {1, 6, 7, 8} can profitably
deviate by choosing color a. We conclude that s8 = a.
As a consequence, for players 1, 6, and 7 we have s1 = s6 = s7 = a as
otherwise any such player could profitably deviate by choosing a.
Thus, the only remaining possible configuration for s is the one indicted
in Figure 1 (by the underlined strategies). But this is not a strong equilibrium
because the coalition K = {1, 4, 5, 6, 7} can profitably deviate by choosing color
c. This yields a contradiction and proves the non-existence of 5-equilibria.
On the other hand, it is easy to see that the strategy profile indicated in
Figure 1 constitutes a 4-equilibrium. This concludes the proof. ⊓⊔
In general, we leave open the question for which k ≥ 2 there exist coordina-
tion games with transition value k.
The above example can be adapted to show that there are coordination
games that do not have the c-FIP but are c-weakly acyclic. Recall that a game G
is c-weakly acyclic if for every joint strategy there exists a finite c-improvement
path that starts at it. Note that a c-weakly acyclic game admits a strong equilib-
rium.
Corollary 6. There is a coordination game that does not have the c-FIP but is
c-weakly acyclic.
Proof. Take the coordination game from Example 1 and modify it by adding to
each color set a new, common color d. Then the joint strategy s in which each
player selects d is a strong equilibrium. Moreover, for each player her payoff in
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s is strictly higher than in any joint strategy in which she chooses another color.
So s can be reached from each joint strategy in just one profitable deviation, by
a coalition of the players who all switch to d. On the other hand, the argument
presented in Example 1 shows that this game does not have the c-FIP. ⊓⊔
5 Inefficiency of k-equilibria
We first summarize some results concerning the strong price of stability of co-
ordination games.
Theorem 7. The strong price of stability is 1 in each of the following cases:
– G is a pseudoforest;
– G is a color forest;
– there are only two colors.
Proof. If G is a pseudoforest, a maximum of P in the lexicographic ordering
defined in the proof of Theorem 2 is a strong equilibrium and a social optimum.
In the other two cases, the social welfare function SW is a generalized ordinal
c-potential. So in both cases each social optimum is a strong equilibrium. ⊓⊔
We next study the k-price of anarchy of our coordination games. It is easy to
see that the price of anarchy is infinite. In fact, this holds independently of the
graph structure, as the next theorem shows.
Theorem 8. For every graph there exists strategy sets for the players such that
the price of anarchy of the resulting coordination game is infinite.
Proof. Let G = (V, E) be an arbitrary graph. We assign to each node i ∈ V a
color set Ai = {xi, c}, where xi is a private color, i.e., xi , x j for every j , i,
and c is a common color. The joint strategy s in which every player chooses
her private color constitutes a Nash equilibrium with SW(s) = 0. On the other
hand, the joint strategy s′ in which every player chooses the common color c is
a social optimum with SW(s′) = 2|E|. ⊓⊔
We now determine the k-price of anarchy and the strong price of anarchy.
We define for every j ∈ N and K ⊆ N and joint strategy s,
NKj (s) = {{i, j} ∈ E | i ∈ K, si = s j}.
Intuitively, |NKj (s)| is the payoff j derives from players in K under s.
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Theorem 9. The k-price of anarchy of coordination games is between 2n−1k−1 − 1
and 2n−1k−1 for every k ∈ {2, . . . , n}. Furthermore, the strong price of anarchy is
exactly 2.
Proof. We first prove the upper bound. By the definition of the payoff function
for all joint strategies s and σ, we have |NKj (σ)| ≤ p j(σK , s−K).
Suppose that the considered game has a k-equilibrium, say s, and let σ be a
social optimum. By the definition of a k-equilibrium, for all coalitions K of size
at most k there exists some j ∈ K such that p j(σK, s−K) ≤ p j(s) and hence by
the above |NKj (σ)| ≤ p j(s).
Fix a coalition K = {v1, . . . , vk} of size k. We know that there is some j ∈ K
such that |NKj (σ)| ≤ p j(s). Rename the nodes so that j = vk. Further, there is a
node j such that
|N{v1 ,...,vk−1}j (σ)| ≤ p j(s).
Again we rename the nodes so that j = vk−1. Continuing this way we obtain that
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k} it holds that |N{v1 ,...,vi}vi (σ)| ≤ pvi (s). Hence
pvi(σ) = |N{v1 ,...,vi}vi (σ)| + |NV\{v1 ,...,vi}vi (σ)| ≤ pvi (s) + |NV\{v1 ,...,vi}vi (σ)|
= pvi (s) + |NK\{v1,...,vi}vi (σ)| + |NV\Kvi (σ)|.
Summing over all players in K we obtain
SWK(σ) ≤ SWK(s) +
k∑
i=1
(
|NK\{v1,...,vi}vi (σ)| + |NV\Kvi (σ)|
)
. (4)
But
k∑
i=1
|NK\{v1,...,vi}vi (σ)| =
k∑
i=1
|{ j > i : {vi, v j} ∈ E+σ}| = |E+σ ∩ E[K]|
and
∑k
i=1 |N
V\K
vi (σ)| = |E+σ ∩ δ(K)|. Hence rewriting (4) yields
SWK(σ) ≤ SWK(s) + |E+σ ∩ E[K]| + |E+σ ∩ δ(K)|.
It also holds that SWK(σ) = 2|E+σ ∩ E[K]| + |E+σ ∩ δ(K)|. So we get
SWK(σ) ≤ SWK(s) + 12SWK(σ) +
1
2
|E+σ ∩ δ(K)|,
which implies that
SWK(σ) ≤ 2SWK(s) + |E+σ ∩ δ(K)|. (5)
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Now we sum over all coalitions K of size k. Each player i appears in
(
n−1
k−1
)
of such sets because it is possible to choose k − 1 out of n− 1 remaining players
to form a set K of size k that contains i. Hence,
∑
K:|K|=k
SWK(σ) =
n∑
i=1
∑
K: K∋i
pi(σ) =
n∑
i=1
(
n − 1
k − 1
)
pi(σ) =
(
n − 1
k − 1
)
SW(σ).
We obtain an analogous expression for the joint strategy s.
Furthermore, for each edge e = {u, v} ∈ E+σ, we can choose 2
(
n−2
k−1
)
sets K
of size k such that e ∈ δ(K). Indeed, assuming that u ∈ K and v < K, we can
choose k − 1 out of n− 2 remaining players to complete K and hence there exist(
n−2
k−1
)
of those sets. Reversing the roles of u and v and summing up yields 2
(
n−2
k−1
)
.
Hence ∑
K:|K|=k
|E+σ ∩ δ(K)| = 2
(
n − 2
k − 1
)
|E+σ| =
(
n − 2
k − 1
)
SW(σ).
By summing over all coalitions K of size k, equation (5) yields
(
n − 1
k − 1
)
SW(σ) ≤ 2
(
n − 1
k − 1
)
SW(s) +
(
n − 2
k − 1
)
SW(σ).
It follows that the k-price of anarchy is at most
2
(
n−1
k−1
)
(
n−1
k−1
)
−
(
n−2
k−1
) = 2n − 1k − 1 .
This concludes the proof of the upper bound.
The claimed lower bounds follow from Examples 3 and 4 given below. ⊓⊔
The following example establishes a lower bound on the k-price of anarchy.
Example 3. Fix n and k ∈ {2, . . . , n}. Let V(G) consist of two sets V1 and V2 of
size k and n − k, respectively, and define
E[G] = {{u, v} | u ∈ V1, v ∈ V1 ∪ V2}.
Fix three colors a, b and c. For v ∈ V1, let A(v) = {a, c}. For v ∈ V2, let A(v) =
{b, c}. Then the color assignment σ in which each player chooses the common
color c is a social optimum. The social welfare is
SW(σ) = SWV1(σ) + SWV2(σ) = k(n − 1) + (n − k)k.
Next we show that the color assignment s in which every node in V1 chooses
a and every node in V2 chooses b is a k-equilibrium. Assume that there is a
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1
{a, b}
2 {a, b}
3
{a, b}
4{a}
Fig. 3. A coordination game showing that the strong price of anarchy is at least 2.
profitable deviation s K→s′ such that |K| ≤ k. Then all nodes in K switch to c and
also all nodes that choose c in s′ are in K. Hence for all v ∈ K, pv(s′) = |Nv∩K|.
So there is a node v ∈ V1 ∩ K because otherwise the payoff of all nodes in
K would remain 0. But then pv(s′) = |Nv ∩ K| ≤ k = pv(s), which yields a
contradiction.
Note that SW(s) = k(k − 1). It follows that the k-price of anarchy is at least
SW(σ)
SW(s) =
k(n − 1) + (n − k)k
k(k − 1) =
2(n − 1) − (k − 1)
k − 1 = 2
n − 1
k − 1 − 1.
⊓⊔
The following example shows that the upper bound of 2 on the strong price
of anarchy (k = n) of Theorem 9 is tight.
Example 4. Consider the graph and the color assignment depicted in Figure 3.
Here (a, a, a, a) is a social optimum with the social welfare 8, while (b, b, b, a)
is a strong equilibrium with the lowest social welfare, 4. So the strong price of
anarchy is 2 in this example of 4 players. By duplicating the graph l times, we
can draw the same conclusion for the case of 4l players. ⊓⊔
6 Complexity
In this section we study complexity issues concerning k-equilibria.
6.1 Verification
First, we show that in general it is hard to decide whether a given joint strategy
is a k-equilibrium.
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Let k-Equilibrium denote the problem to decide, given a coordination game
with a joint strategy s and k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, whether s is a k-equilibrium.
Theorem 10. k-Equilibrium is co-NP-complete.
Proof. It is easy to verify that k-Equilibrium is in co-NP: a certificate of a NO-
instance is a profitable deviation of a coalition of size at most k.
We show the hardness by reduction of the complement of Clique, which is
a co-NP-complete problem. Let (G, k) be an instance thereof. We construct an
instance of k-Equilibrium as follows. For v ∈ V let Av = {xv, y}, where color y
and all colors xv, v ∈ V are distinct. Furthermore, for every node v ∈ V we add
k − 2 nodes u1v , . . . , uk−2v and edges {v, uiv} for i = 1, . . . , k − 2. These additional
nodes can only choose the color xv. Let s be the joint strategy in which every
node v ∈ V chooses xv. We claim that this is a k-equilibrium if and only if G has
no clique of size k.
Suppose G has a clique K of size k. Then jointly deviating to y yields to
each node in K a payoff of k − 1, whereas every node has a payoff of k − 2 in s.
So this is a profitable deviation. For the other direction, suppose that there is a
profitable deviation s K→s′ by a coalition K of size at most k. Then every node in
K deviates to y and hence belongs to V. Since every node in K has a payoff of
k − 2 in s, pv(s′) ≥ k − 1 for all v ∈ K. So v is connected to at least k − 1 nodes
in K. This implies that K is a clique of size k. ⊓⊔
We next show that for color forests the decision problem is in P. First we
show that we can focus on certain profitable deviations which we call simple: Fix
a joint strategy s and a coalition K. We call K connected if G[K] is connected.
A deviation s K→s′ is simple if K is connected and s′ = (xK , s−K) for some color
x.
Lemma 4. Let s be a joint strategy in a coordination game. If there is a prof-
itable deviation by a coalition of size at most k, then there is also a simple
profitable deviation by a coalition of size at most k.
Proof. Let s K→s′ be a profitable deviation with |K| ≤ k. Pick an arbitrary v ∈ K
and let x = s′v. Let L consist of those nodes u ∈ K for which s′u = x and u is
reachable in G[K] from v. Let s′′ = (xL, s−L). Then the deviation to s′′ is simple.
For all nodes u ∈ L, we have NKu (s′) = NLu (s′) = NLu (s′′) by the definition of L.
Furthermore, NV\Ku (s′) ⊆ NV\Lu (s′) ⊆ NV\Lu (s′′). Hence
pu(s′) = |NKu (s′)| + |NV\Ku (s′)| ≤ |NLu (s′′)| + |NV\Lu (s′′)| = pu(s′′),
which implies that the deviation to s′′ is profitable for u. ⊓⊔
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Theorem 11. Consider a coordination game on a color forest. Then there exists
a polynomial-time algorithm that decides whether a given joint strategy is a
k-equilibrium and, if this is not the case, outputs a profitable deviation of a
coalition of size at most k.
Proof. For a statement P we write below [[P]] to denote the variable that is
1 if P is true and 0 otherwise. For a function f : V → R and U ⊆ V , let
f (U) = ∑v∈U f (v). For a function F : V → 2V let F(U) = ⋃v∈U F(v).
Let s be a joint strategy. By Lemma 4 it is sufficient to check for the exis-
tence of simple profitable deviations by coalitions of size at most k. Thus, we
let x ∈ M and we search for simple profitable deviations in which the coalition
deviates to x. Because a coalition in a simple deviation is connected, we can
check each connected component of G[Vx] separately. Assume without loss of
generality that G[Vx] itself is connected, i.e., is a tree. Pick an arbitrary root r of
G[Vx] and define for each node the children, parent, and rooted subtree in the
usual way (with respect to r). For each node v ∈ Vx let Cv ⊆ Vx denote the set
of children of v and let Pv ∈ Vx denote the parent of v (if v , r). Finally, let Tv
denote the subtree of G[Vx] rooted at v. For each node v, we define U(v), D(v),
Up(v), and Dp(v) as follows.
– U(v) is a connected coalition K ⊆ Tv of minimum size such that v ∈ K and
the deviation to (xK , s−K) is profitable for all nodes in K (if such a coalition
exists). We denote the properties it has to satisfy by (∗).
– D(v) = |U(v)| if U(v) exists and ∞ otherwise.
– Up(v) is a connected coalition L ⊆ Tv of minimum size such that v ∈ L
and the deviation to (xL′ , s−L′) is profitable for all nodes in L, where L′ :=
L∪{Pv} (if such a coalition exists). We denote the properties it has to satisfy
by (∗∗). (Note that the deviation is not required to be profitable for Pv even
though Pv ∈ L′.)
– Dp(v) = |Up(v)| if Up(v) exists and ∞ otherwise.
We can compute D, Dp, U and Up using a dynamic program as follows.
Let v ∈ Vx and suppose we found these objects for all children of v. Let U ⊆ Cv
minimize Dp(U) among all sets U′ ⊆ Cv that satisfy Dp(U′) < ∞ and
|U′| + [[sPv = x]] > pv(s) (6)
if such a set exists. In this case set U(v) = {v} ∪ Up(U) and D(v) = |U(v)|.
Otherwise, we set it to ∞.
We first prove that K := U(v) satisfies (∗) if U(v) exists. The set K is
connected because v ∈ K and all sets Up(u) are connected, for u ∈ Cv. It is
profitable for v to deviate to x because of (6). The deviation is profitable for
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nodes u ∈ K \ {v} because Up(u) ⊆ K, P(u) ∈ K (by the connectivity of K) and
Up(u) satisfies (∗∗). Furthermore, K is of minimal size amongst all coalitions
that satisfy (∗). Indeed, if K′ is another such coalition, then U′ := K∩Cv satisfies
(6) because it is profitable to deviate to x for v. It is profitable for u ∈ U′ to
deviate to x and hence |K ∩ T (u)| ≥ Dp(u), which implies |K′| ≥ 1 + Dp(U′).
Therefore |K′| ≥ 1 + Dp(U) by the minimality of U. But |K| = |{v} ∪ Up(U)| =
1 + Dp(U), which shows that |K′| ≥ |K|.
Similarly, for v ∈ Vx \ {r}, let W ⊆ Cv minimize Dp(W) among all sets
W ′ ⊆ Cv that satisfy Dp(W ′) < ∞ and
|W ′| + 1 > pv(s) (7)
if such a set exists. In this case set Up(v) = {v} ∪ Up(W) and Dp(v) = |Up(v)|.
Otherwise, we set Dp(v) = ∞. Similar arguments as before show that if Up(v)
exists then it indeed satisfies (∗∗).
Note that we can compute U(v) in polynomial time by sorting the nodes
u ∈ Cv in increasing order of Dp(u) and then successively adding nodes to U(v)
until (6) is satisfied. Similarly, we can compute Up(v) efficiently. This shows
that the algorithm runs in polynomial time.
Now, let s K→s′ be a simple profitable deviation to x such that |K| ≤ k. Let v
be the root of G[K] according to our previously fixed ordering. By the properties
of the function D, we know that D(v) ≤ |K| ≤ k. Conversely, if D(v) ≤ k for
some node v, then U(v) of size D(v) ≤ k is the coalition we are looking for. ⊓⊔
6.2 Computing strong equilibria
Next we focus on the problem of actually computing a strong equilibrium. As
we show below, this is possible for certain graph classes.
Corollary 7. Consider a coordination game on a color forest. Then a strong
equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. We begin with an arbitrary initial joint strategy s. Putting k = n, by
Theorem 11 there is an algorithm that decides whether s is a strong equilibrium
and, if this is not the case, outputs a profitable deviation s K→s′. In the first case,
we output s; in the second case, we repeat the procedure with s′. We know
that SW(s) is a natural number and SW(s′) > SW(s) by Corollary 1, so at most
maxs∈S SW(s) ≤ 2|E| steps are necessary to reach a strong equilibrium. ⊓⊔
Theorem 12. Consider a coordination game on a color complete graph. Then
a strong equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time.
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Proof. This follows from Lemma 3 and the corresponding result for monotone
increasing congestion games in which all strategies are singletons, established
in [33]. ⊓⊔
Theorem 13. Consider a coordination game on a pseudoforest. Then a strong
equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. We first show that for a tree, a strong equilibrium can be computed effi-
ciently via dynamic programming. By Corollary 1 it suffices to compute a social
optimum. Let T be a tree and root it at an arbitrary node r ∈ V(T ). Given a node
i ∈ V(T ), let Ti denote the subtree of T that is rooted at i and let Ci be the set of
children of i. Given a color si ∈ S i, define di(si) as the maximum social welfare
achievable by the nodes in Ti if node i chooses color si. Note that for each leaf
i ∈ V(T ) of T we have di(si) = 0 for all si ∈ S i. Consider a node i ∈ V(T )
that is not a leaf and assume we computed all values d j(s j) for every j ∈ Ci
and s j ∈ S j. Define [[s j = si]] to be 1 if s j = si and 0 otherwise. We can then
compute di(si) for every si ∈ S i as follows:
di(si) =
∑
j ∈ Ci
max
s j∈S j
(d j(s j) + 2[[s j = si]]).
The intuition here is that we account for every child j ∈ Ci of i for the maximum
social welfare achievable in T j plus an additional contribution of 2 if i and j
choose the same color.
Computing di(si) for all si ∈ S i takes time at most O(m2|Ci|), where m is the
number of colors. Thus, it takes time O(m2|V(T )|) to compute all values dr(sr)
for sr ∈ S r of the root node r. The optimal social welfare of the tree T is then
SW(T ) = maxsr∈S r dr(sr). The corresponding optimal joint strategy s∗T can be
determined using some standard bookkeeping.
Next suppose that T is a pseudotree. Let C = (i1, . . . , ik) be the unique
cycle in T . Note that it might no longer be sufficient to simply compute a social
optimum for T . Instead, the idea is to compute a social optimum s∗T of T such
that, if possible, C is unicolored.
Note that if such a social optimum does not exist, then there is an edge
in C that is not unicolored. Let SW( j), j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, be the maximum social
welfare of the tree that one obtains from T by removing edge {i j, i j+1} from C
(where we define ik+1 = i1). Note that we can efficiently compute SW( j) by using
the dynamic program for trees described above.8 Let SW1 = max j=1,...,k SW( j).
Computing SW1 takes time O(k · m2|V(T )|) = O(nm2|V(T )|).
8 Observe that we do not enforce that the endpoints of the removed edge {i j, i j+1} obtain different
colors in the optimal solution. In fact, subsequently it will become clear that we do not have
to do so.
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Next assume a social optimum exists in which all nodes of C are unicolored.
Note that if we remove the edges on C from T then T decomposes into k trees,
rooted at i1, . . . , ik. We can compute di j (·) for every root i j as described above.
Let R = ∩kj=1S i j be the set of common colors of the nodes in C. If all nodes in
C choose color c ∈ R then we obtain a social welfare of
SW(c) = 2k +
k∑
j=1
di j (c).
Let SW2 = maxc∈R SW(c). The time needed to compute SW2 is at most
O(m2|V(T )| + k · m).
Clearly, if SW1 > SW2 then there is no social optimum in which all nodes
of C have the same color. In this case, we choose an arbitrary social optimum.
Otherwise, there exists a social optimum in which all nodes of C have a common
color. In this case, we choose such a social optimum. Let the resulting social
optimum for pseudotree T be s∗T .
By proceeding this way for each pseudotree T of the given pseudoforest G,
we obtain a joint strategy s∗ that maximizes the social welfare and the number
of unicolored cycles. By Corollary 2, s∗ is a strong equilibrium of G. The time
needed per pseudotree T is dominated by O(nm2|V(T )|). The total time needed
to compute s∗ is thus at most O(n2m2). ⊓⊔
7 Conclusions
We introduced and studied a natural class of games which we termed coordi-
nation games on graphs. We provided results on the existence, inefficiency and
computation of strong equilibria for these games.
It would be interesting to prove existence of k-equilibria for other graph
classes and to investigate the computational complexity of computing them.
Another open question is to determine the (strong) price of anarchy when the
number of colors is fixed. Yet another intriguing question is for which k ≥ 2
coordination games with transition value k exist. In Section 4.5 we settled this
question positively only for k = 2 and k = 4. In the future we also plan to study
a natural extension of our coordination games to hypergraphs.
Another natural question that comes to one’s mind is whether super strong
equilibria exist. Recall that a joint strategy s is a super strong equilibrium if
for all coalitions K there does not exist a deviation s′ = (s′K , s−K) such that
pi(s′) ≥ pi(s) for all i ∈ K and pi(s′) > pi(s) for some i ∈ K. It is not hard to
verify that super strong equilibria are not guaranteed to exist: Consider a path
consisting of two edges and assume that the nodes have color sets {a}, {a, b}
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and {b}, respectively. Clearly, a super strong equilibrium does not exist for this
instance.
A natural generalization of our model are coordination games on weighted
graphs. Here each edge {i, j} has a non-negative weight wi j specifying how much
player i and j profit from choosing the same color. It is easy to see that 12SW con-
tinues to be an exact potential function for weighted coordination games, guar-
anteeing the existence of a Nash equilibrium. In fact, as observed in [13], this
is an exact potential for coordination games with arbitrary weights. Coordina-
tion games on weighted graphs are studied in more detail in [31]. In particular,
the existence results for strong equilibria (Theorems 1 and 2) and 2-equilibria
(Corollary 3) do not hold for these games. We refer the reader to [31] for further
studies of these games.
Another natural variation is to consider coordination games on weighted di-
rected graphs. Given a directed graph G = (V, E), we say that node j is a neigh-
bour of node i if there is an edge ( j, i) in G. Each edge ( j, i) has a non-negative
weight w ji specifying how much player i profits from choosing the same color
as player j. The transition from undirected to directed graphs changes the status
of the games substantially. In particular, Nash equilibria need not always exist
in these games. Moreover, the problem of determining the existence of Nash
equilibria is NP-complete. We refer the reader to [5] and [35] for further studies
of these games.
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A c-FIP and generalized ordinal c-potentials
Theorem 14. A finite game has the c-FIP iff a generalized ordinal c-potential
for it exists.
Proof. (⇒) We use here the argument given in the proof of [29] of the fact that
every finite game that has the FIP (finite improvement property) has a general-
ized ordinal potential.
Consider a branching tree of which the root has all joint strategies as suc-
cessors, of which the non-root elements are joint strategies, and of which the
branches are the c-improvement paths. Because the game is finite, this tree is
finitely branching.
Ko¨nig’s Lemma of [27] states that any finitely branching tree is either finite
or it has an infinite path. So by the assumption, the considered tree is finite.
Hence the number of c-improvement paths is finite. Given a joint strategy s, de-
fine P(s) to be the number of prefixes of the c-improvement paths that terminate
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in s. Then P is a generalized ordinal c-potential, where we use the strict linear
ordering on the natural numbers.
(⇐) Immediate, as already noted in [23]. ⊓⊔
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